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BEYOND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY:
EMPLOYER FAILURE TO ADDRESS RETALIATION BY
CO-WORKERS AFTER TITLE VII PROTECTED ACTITY
Shortly after Cindy complained to her supervisors about
being sexually harassed at work, she filed claims with the State
Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After filing these claims, she
noticed that her co-workers began to behave differently toward
her.' Cindy had always been involved in the social aspects of the
office and was generally pleased with the interactions she had
with her co-workers. After filing the harassment complaint, she
overheard co-workers refer to her as stupid and a problemmaker. She heard them speculate about her motives for filing
the lawsuit against the company.
Cindy gradually discovered that some of her co-workers told
others to completely avoid contact with her. She initially felt
ostracized, but tried her best to enjoy her job. Over the next few
weeks, however, simply going to work became difficult. On one
occasion, she found manure piled around her car when she left
the office. The next afternoon, she was struck in the head with a
rubber band while seated at her desk. A few days later, she
found hair in her food at lunch in the employee lounge. After
noticing that her car had been scratched while parked at the
office, she decided she had had enough. Cindy filed a retaliation
claim with the EEOC.
During, the 1998-1999 term, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on several cases and addressed several important Title
VII 2 issues. These opinions, most notably Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,4 alerted
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on Richardson

v.

N.Y

State Dept of Corr.

Seru., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999). In Richardson, the plaintiff filed claims with the
EEOC after being subjected to racial harassment in the workplace. Among the claims
filed, the plaintiff alleged that co-workers retaliated against Richardson after her initial
complaint. She also alleged that the company retaliated against her when it failed to
respond to retaliatory acts waged against her by her supervisors and co-workers. Id. at

445. The parties disputed over whether the employer subjected her to any adverse
employment action and whether there was any causal connection between the
employment actions and Richardson's claims with the EEOC. The court recognized that
there was a circuit split regarding whether an employer is liable when it fails to address
co-worker retaliation. Despite the split, the Second Circuit ultimately concluded that it
would impose liability when such retaliation was sufficiently severe. Id. at 445-46.
2. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). In Burlington, respondent Ellerth had been a salesperson at
a division of Burlington Industries. Id. at 747. Ellerth quit her job and subsequently
filed complaints against the corporation, alleging that constant sexual harassment by her
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employers that they would be subject to expanded liability for
sexual harassment in the workplace. 5 Specifically ruling on
instances of sexual harassment by supervisors, the Court held
that employers would be vicariously liable when the harassment
results in a tangible employment action. 6 When no such tangible
action has resulted, employers may nonetheless be held
responsible for the harassment. The Court has created an
affirmative defense to claims of harassment that is only
available to those employers who have effective anti-harassment
policies in7 place and have responded appropriately to the alleged
incident.

Several of these aspects of increased liability have been held
applicable to retaliation claims made pursuant to section 704(a)
of Title VII. 9 The Court has not, however, offered direct

managers, mid-level supervisors, led to her resignation. Id. Specifically, she focused on
three incidents where the supervisor's advances could be construed as threats regarding
"tangible job benefits." Id. at 747. She refused any advances, but did not tell authority
figures in the company about the harassment. Id. The Court held that the employer
would be responsible for sexual harassment by supervisors when there were tangible job
consequences. Id. at 760-61. In the absence of such consequences, defendant employers
would be vicariously liable for the harassment unless they could assert an affirmative
defense. Id. The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's reversal of summary judgment
and remanded, allowing for the plaintiff to amend her complaint or supplement her
discovery. Id. at 766.
4. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The FaragherCourt adopted the same holding it outlined in
Burlington. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 764. In Faragher,the plaintiff worked as a lifeguard
for the City of Boca Raton, Florida, from 1985-1990. Faragher,524 U.S. at 780. Two
years after her resignation, she brought a hostile environment sexual harassment claim
against the city. Id. The claim stated that Faragher's supervisors subjected her to
uninvited and offensive touching, lewd remarks and offensive comments. Id. The Court,
agreeing with the district court, found that this conduct affected the "terms, conditions,
and privileges" of employment and was sufficiently serious to constitute an abusive
environment. Id. at 784-85.
5. The range of behavior that constitutes sexual harassment has been expanding.
In 1998, the Court ruled that liability extends to same-sex harassment. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). Two years earlier, the Court
held that employers may be liable for post-employment retaliation. See Robinson v. Shell
Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1996).
6. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 760-61. The Court defined a tangible employment action
as one that "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Id. at 761.
7. Id.
8. Throughout this Note section 703 and section 704 of Title VII refer to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 and § 2000e-3 respectively.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994); e.g., Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d
784, 791-92 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the liability principles in Burlington to retaliation
claims).
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guidance in the resolution of retaliation claims from employees
like Cindy. 1° Instead, the Court has left employers and
employees alike wondering when a claim for retaliation may be
meritorious. The outcome of a retaliation suit will vary based on
which circuit the employee brings suit in and how that court
characterizes the behavior she cites as retaliatory."
This Note suggests that employers should not be liable for
Title VII retaliation claims when an employer does not address
retaliatory harassment by co-workers directed toward an
employee after the employee has engaged in activity protected by
Title VII.
The analysis begins with a discussion of the
importance of this issue in the context of expanding liability and
an increasing number of retaliation claims. The next section
discusses the standards courts have applied to employer liability
in sexual harassment cases and introduces the applicability, if
any, of those standards in the context of retaliatory harassment.
After outlining the elements of a prima facie Title VII retaliation
claim, the discussion turns to the reasons that such an omission
by an employer should not be actionable retaliation under
section 704 of Title VII. Finally, this Note concludes that the
employer's failure to address retaliation by co-workers is not the
type of repercussion that the policies behind section 704 were
intended to address, because such conduct cannot be causally
connected with the employee's protected activity and does not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action.
OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII AND RETALIATION

Rise of Retaliation Claims
The last decade has seen a rapid increase in the number of
retaliation claims filed by employees under section 704 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 In 1999 alone, employees

10. Margery Corbin Eddy, Finding the Appropriate Standardfor Employer Liability
in Title VII Retaliation Cases: An Examinationof the Applicability of Sexual Harassment
Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. REV. 361, 361 (1999) (noting that, though the Supreme Court's
rulings in recent cases have addressed employer liability for sexual harassment, "none
directly confront employer liability regarding . . . retaliation"); see infra text
accompanying notes 110-72 (analyzing the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim
and the variety of tests utilized by the circuits to meet those elements).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 110-74.
12. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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3
filed 17,883 Title VII retaliation claims with the EEOC.'
Despite the growth in retaliation claims and a very real need for
uniform rules defining when to hold employers liable for'
retaliatory acts of employees, the Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of what standard should be applied in those
cases. Left to derive their own standards, circuit courts utilize a
wide range of parameters to determine whether an employer
engaged in actionable retaliatory conduct against its employee.14
Because of these varying standards, employers and employees
may be uncertain of when behavior is retaliatory. In light of the
increasing volume of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC and
the need for consistency in application of the law, a more
uniform standard would be beneficial.
"By its nature, a retaliation claim alleges that [an] employer
intentionally took adverse personnel action in retaliation for an
employee's opposition to discrimination or participation in a
discrimination proceeding." 5 Such employment actions often
consist of the employer terminating the employee, involuntarily
transferring her to a less desirable facility, or perhaps reducing
her pay.' 6 Some employees allege retaliation for harms such as
diminished responsibilities in the workplace and ostracism by coworkers.' 7
It is important to recognize that "not every action occurring
in the workplace is a term, condition, or privilege of
employment." 8 Regardless of whether an action constitutes an
adverse employment action, it is significant to recognize that
workplace actions impact, in small and large ways, the

13. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS FROM THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMON, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Jan. 12, 2000).
14. See infra notes 110-75 and accompanying text.
15. Jeffery S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Retaliation: A Potent Claim in Litigation,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 3.
16. Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII,
the ADA, and the ADA- Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved
Courts, 63 MO. L. REV. 115, 133 (1998). Most courts would agree that such actions by
employers could form the foundation of a retaliation claim. See id.
17. Compare Scusa v. Nestle, 181 F.3d 958, 969 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding no retaliation
when the " appellant's only claim of retaliation [was] that her co-workers shunned her")
with Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that general rudeness, including ostracism, of co-workers can form the basis of an
employer's liability for retaliation).
18. Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in
Requiring Employment DiscriminationPlaintiffs to Prove That the Employer's Action
Was MateriallyAdverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 365 (1999).
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employee's experience. 19
Not all negative impacts on an
employee's working environment, however, will be sufficient to
constitute an adverse employment action that satisfies the
20
burden necessary for a retaliation claim.
During the 1990s, the number of retaliation claims grew
rapidly. 2 1 Retaliation charges filed with the EEOC increased
more than seventy-two percent from 1992 to 1998, resulting in
more than 19,000 such claims in fiscal year 1998.22 Though the
number of claims filed under the anti-retaliation provisions of all
federal anti-discrimination laws have increased, "[tihe bulk of
the growth in charges has occurred under Title VII, which
accounted for 10,499 charges in 1992 and 16,394 in 1998."23
When compared with other claims received by the EEOC,
the percentage of retaliation charges as a total percentage of
charges handled by the EEOC grew nearly fifty percent over a
seven year period in the 1990s. 24 As of January 1999, retaliation
charges accounted for roughly twenty-two and one-half percent
of the sum total of charges that the EEOC processes. 2 Because
of both the large numerical increase in retaliation claims and the
substantial volume of such claims in relation to charges the
EEOC processes, there is a serious need to do something to
control the increase in retaliation claims.26
Though meritorious claims clearly must be addressed, the
courts must draw a line before employers become strictly liable
for any type of non-employment related conduct of their
employees. Without a restriction on the liability of employers in
these situations, retaliation claims will increase to a level at
which the courts simply will not be able to address all of the
meritorious claims. 27 Strict liability for all actions of employees
19. See, e.g., Essary & Friedman, aupra note 16, at 133-40 (discussing the standards
courts use to determine what kinds of negative workplace experiences constitute an
adverse action in a retaliation claim).
20. See id.
21. Klein & Pappas, supra note 15, at 3.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. Teresa L. Butler & A. Michael Weber, Retaliation Lawsuits Are Increasing
Rapidly, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at B5.

25. Id.
26. Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern.- Will Courts Know It When They See It?,
14 LAB. LAW. 373, 412 (1998) ("TIThe EEOC and the federal judiciary are being deluged

with an endless wave of employment discrimination cases. In fact, employment related
litigation is 'currently the fastest growing area of litigation in the country.' (citation
omitted)).

27. See id. at 413.
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would overwhelm the court system. Furthermore, strict liability
is not necessary to advance the policies of Title VII's anti2
retaliation provision. 8
Plaintiffs frequently raise retaliation claims; 29 therefore, the
need to have a consistent result in the outcomes of such claims is
important. Despite the apparent benefits of clear rules in this
area, the circuits are split on what test to apply in determining
the defirition of an actionable adverse action when ruling on
retaliation claims. 30 Even within many of the circuits, employers
and employees often enter litigation without knowing how the
court will apply the guidelines of that circuit to the particular
case. 31 Simply articulated, bright line rules about what actions
expose an employer to a Title VII retaliation claim liability are
rare. 32 Instead, employers are left with little guidance as to
when a court will consider their employment decisions to be
33
actionable.
Because courts approach retaliation claims on a case-by-case
basis, employers are often in the dark as to whether an action
will be considered unlawful until a court makes a decision on
liability. 34 Employers may be liable for retaliation even when
the employee is unable to recover on her underlying
discrimination complaint. 35
"Accordingly, in order to avoid
claims of retaliation, employers must take special precautions
28. Courts have successfully held employers vicariously liable for certain categories
of behavior in the workplace, such as when a supervisor engages in sexual harassment
that results in a tangible employment action, without having to implement a broad
blanket of liability for conduct of all employees. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1998).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
30. See Alan R. Kabat & Debra S. Katz, Racial and Sexual Harassment Employment
Law, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 547, 607 (Am. Law Inst. ed.
1999), WL SE05 ALI-ABA 547.

31. In Knox v. Indiana, the Seventh Circuit held that "nothing in the law of
retaliation.., restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee

who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint ....

[Aidverse actions can come in

many shapes and sizes." 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the law "does

not take a 'laundry list' approach to retaliation," instead leaving the jury to determine
whether certain conduct is retaliatory on a case-by-case basis).
32. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 373-74.

33. In the context of sexual harassment, as with other areas of the law, employers
may be held liable for their failure to act, as well as for their acts. See Burlington, 524

U.S. at 759. This principle of law is a basic premise upon which this Note, as well as legal
precedent, relies. As the Supreme Court stated in Faragher, employers are frequently
held liable when they have actual knowledge of sufficiently harassing conduct by
employees but have failed to stop such conduct. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 789 (1998).

34. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 374 (citations omitted).
35. Klein & Pappas, supra note 15, at 3.
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when seeking to discipline or discharge employees who have
brought discrimination claims, even where those claims are
meritless."36 In recognition of the real possibility of employees
bringing successful retaliation claims even after their underlying
discrimination claim is denied, employers should take the
utmost care to document behavior prior to any disciplinary
action.37 Faced with the uncertainty that currently shrouds the
realm of retaliation claims, an employer must carefully ponder
any decision to exert control in the workplace.
The need for the Supreme Court to address the issue of what
conduct is sufficient to form the basis of retaliation is apparent,
both from the standpoint of employers and the public.
Employers need to know what actions are categorized as
retaliatory, regardless of which circuit an employee brings suit
in or which judge or jury happens to hear the case, in order to
create effective disciplinary policies. Though discipline is a
serious matter that should- not be undertaken lightly, an
employer should not have to walk on eggshells should it desire to
correct a legitimately disruptive situation in the workplace.
Given the rapidly increasing volume of retaliation claims
flooding the "EEOC, the courts should more clearly define
actionable adverse actions needed for retaliations claims before
such claims overwhelm the system. As the following discussion
suggests, a common standard for employer liability may best
serve to increase the effectiveness of the important protections
contained in Title VII.
Purpose of the RetaliationProvision of Title VII
Various federal statutes prohibit employer retaliation for
specific employee acts.3 8 These statutes each forbid retaliation
against employees who report violations of the particular
statute, 39 participate in a legal proceeding arising under a
statute, 40 or oppose employers' behaviors that constitute
violations of the applicable statute. 41 Congress intended the
anti-retaliation provisions to increase the effectiveness of the
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 375 (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994); Family and Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994)).
39. E.g., Family and Medical Leave Act § 2615(bXl).
40. E.g., id. § 2615(bX3).
41. E.g., id. § 2615(aX2).
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statute by protecting employees from potentially adverse
consequences that may otherwise follow from reporting a
violation of the statute. 4 2 Additionally, the protection afforded
by this type of anti-retaliation provision encourages employees to
report violations of Title VII. 4
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects employees who
oppose discrimination made unlawful by or who participate in
44
proceedings associated with Title VII causes of action.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment .. . because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter. 45
Though terminations and reductions in pay are the clearest
actions that could constitute retaliatory conduct, these
employment actions are simply the starting point for a wide
range of conduct that can be considered retaliatory. 46 The type
of conduct that courts may consider retaliatory includes:
[T]he filing of a counterclaim in a lawsuit, transfer or
reassignment, termination, suspension with pay, failure to
promote, changing the required qualifications for an appliedfor position, exclusion from necessary information, refusal to
process a grievance,... deviation from established in-house
procedures, selectively strict enforcement of a leave policy,
reprimands and probation, extension of a probationary
period, harassment, disciplinary demotion, unjustified
evaluations and reports, loss of normal work assignments,
denial of a customary commendation letter, manipulating
bumping rights, and adverse statements to prospective
employers .

.

. [and] caus[ing] fellow employees .

.

. to act

adversely toward the employee.' 7
The wide range of conduct that can be considered retaliatory
in nature greatly increases the importance of courts clarifying
42. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 375.

43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).

45. Id.
46. See Lidge, supra note 18, at 344.
47. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
668-69 (3d ed. 1996).
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the standards to use for determining liability in retaliation
claims. Without clear standards for employer liability and a
common definition of what constitutes an adverse employment
action, 48 behavior that otherwise may be simply the result of an
ill-mannered co-worker could ultimately wind up as the basis for
a lawsuit against a company.4 9
STANDARDS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT

Comparisonof Employer's Liability in Tort and Title VII
Prior to analyzing whether employers should be responsible
for retaliatory acts of their employees against co-workers, it is
necessary to discuss the various theories under which an
employer can be held responsible for its employees' actions. An
employer may be held liable for the acts of its employees either
vicariously under the doctrine of respondeat superior50 or
directly through negligence theories, including negligent hiring,
retention, or supervision. 51 Though these theories do not lead to
an absolute responsibility for any actions of employees, they do
provide an incentive for employers to police the workforce 5and
2
ensure that their employees are not committing tortious acts.
Respondeat superior is premised on the notion that
employers should not be able to distance themselves from
responsibility for acts employees commit that might be seen as
part of the employers' activities.0 Employers are strictly liable
for the intentional torts of employees that are within the scope of
employment.5 4 Jurisdictions apply various definitions of scope of
employment, but generally the tests build from the definition set
forth in the Restatement of Agency.55 Acts that a person is
48. See infra text accompanying notes 164-74.
49. See Kabat & Katz, supra note 30, at 607.
50. For a discussion on respondeat superior, see infra notes 53- 57 and accompanying
text.
51. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. An employer may also be liable
vicariously through the acts of managers and other employees who are sufficiently placed
in the organization that their acts may be deemed the acts of the corporation. See
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998).
52. See Faragher,524 U.S at 763-65.
53. MARKA. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.28 (1994).

54. J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 81 VA.
L. REV. 273, 289 (1995).
55. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 53, § 2.28.
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hired to perform, which occur within the authorized employment
time and space limits, and that intentionally use force by the
harassing employee against the object of harassment, which is
not unexpectable by the employer are generally within the scope
of employment.5 6 An act is considered to be out of the scope of
5
employment when it goes beyond those bounds 1
At common law, employers can be directly liable for the acts
of employees through negligent hiring, retention, or
supervision.18 This liability is premised on the employer's own
conduct, either by condoning behavior or failing to prevent
conduct.5 9 This common law tort action requires employers to
take reasonable measures to prevent employees from causing
intentional, tortious harm.60 As with other tort actions, this
liability arises from a duty of care that has been breached
causing some type of harm.6 1 For example, a breach of care
could occur when an employer fails to adequately screen
prospective employees 62 or does not take appropriate corrective
action when he/she knows that an employee is committing
wrongful and intentional torts.63
The remaining sections of this Note explore how the theories
of employer liability apply in the statutory regime of Title VII.
Some suggest that Title VII might impose "a nondelegable duty
to keep the workplace free from discrimination."6 Such a duty
would impose strict liability and would cause employers to
extensively police employees. 65 Employers have never been
construed to have such a duty. Instead common law tort
required employers to take reasonable precautions to provide a
non-discriminating environment.6
The Supreme Court, in
Burlington67 and Faragher,68 answered the question of when
employers will be liable for acts of its supervisors. The guidance
offered by the Court in those decisions provides a useful
56. Id.
57. Id.

58. See Verkerke, supra note 54, at 305.
59. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious
Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 759

(1999).
60. Verkerke, supra note 54, at 306.
61. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 759.
62. Verkerke, supra note 54, at 306.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 289 n.46.
65. See id.

66. See id.
67. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
68. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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framework for understanding employer liability for acts of all
employees that may violate Title VII.
Liability of Employers for Acts of Supervisors Under Title VII
69
The twin decisions of Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth
and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,70 provide some guidance as
to when employers will be held vicariously liable under section
703 for actions of their employees and supervisors in the context
of sexual harassment claims. 1
These landmark decisions
expanded employer liability for hostile-environment sexual
harassment when the actions of supervisors are involved and
have clearly put employers on notice that the extent of liability
in these situations is fairly significant.7 2 After Burlington and
Faragher,employers are vicariously liable for an alleged sexually
hostile environment when it "is created by a supervisor with
immediate or successively higher authority over the complaining
employee."7 3 Though an employer will be strictly liable when
the harassment leads to a tangible employment action,7 the
Court defined a two-pronged affirmative defense that an
employer could raise in the face of liability when there is no
tangible employment decision. 75
The two prongs of the
affirmative defense are "that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or avoid harm otherwise." 76 This
defense provides an employer the opportunity to take corrective
measures and to avoid liability when it has acted appropriately.
In Burlington, the Court defined tangible employment
actions as "a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant

69. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
70. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
71. See Butler & Weber, supra note 24, at B5.

See also supra notes 3-4 for an

overview of the facts underlying the Burlington and Faragherdecisions.
72. See Butler & Weber, supra note 24, at B5.
73. Jeffrey M. Lipman & Hugh J. Cain, Evolution in Hostile Environment Claims
since Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 47 DRAKE L. REV. 585, 592 (1999).
74. See id.; infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (defining tangible employment
action).
75. Id.
76. Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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change in benefits," 77 Generally, such a change "inflicts direct
economic harm"7 8 on the plaintiff. Consistent with the apparent
requirement of economic harm, one court has held that
allegations that a supervisor insulted, failed to compliment,
assigned menial tasks, and questioned the use of sick leave and
vacation of female employees did not constitute tangible
79
employment actions.
Subsequent to the holdings in Burlington and Faragher,
employers know when they will be liable under section 703 of
Title VII for actions of supervisors.80 As the Court held in
Faragher, an employer will be vicariously, liable when a
supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over
an employee creates an actionable hostile environment.8 '
Employers may assert an affirmative defense when the
supervisor's conduct has not resulted in a tangible employment
action.8 2 These decisions directly impact sexual harassment
claims resulting from the acts of supervisors, but the Court's
analysis suggests that it may apply to employer liability for acts
of all employees.
Liability of Employers for Acts of Employees Under Title VII
Though Burlington and Faragherconcerned liability for the
actions of supervisors, the Court provided some insight as to the
extent that employers may be liable for actions of nonsupervisory employees. 83 Prior to laying out the new rule
regarding the extent of liability for actions of supervisors, the
Court, citing principles of agency law and the existing body of
case law, noted "fain employer may be liable for both negligent
and intentional torts committed by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment." 84 The Court did seem to indicate
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761.
Id. at 762.
Caro v. City of Dallas, 17 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.

82. Id.
83. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-55.
84. Id. at 756.
Conduct... is within the scope of employment (when] (a) it is of the kind
he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a

purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the
servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the
master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).

20001

BEYOND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY

some concern that an employer's liability not be extended too far.
As the Court pondered in Burlington:
Were [the existence of an agency relation in the workplace
and the resulting proximity and regular conduct] to satisfy [a
standard for liability], an employer would be subject to
vicarious liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but
also for all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by
neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have
85
considered the issue.
Consequently, the Court concluded that only supervisors or
persons with authority could cause a tangible employment
action.8
The Court observed that agency principles do not limit an
employer's liability, for the actions of employees, to the scope of
employment.87 This allows courts to find employers liable for
acts of their employees that do not fit within the apparent
authority of the employer or otherwise serve a business
purpose.88 "District Courts and Courts of Appeals . . . [have]
uniformly judg[ed] employer liability for co-worker harassment
under a negligence standard."8 9 Within the context of sexual
harassment by employees, an employer is directly liable for
negligence if it "knew or should have known of the charged
sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and
appropriate .corrective action."90
Courts often phrase this
standard in the language of actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment. 9 1 Constructive knowledge is charged when "the
harassment complained of is so open and pervasive that the
employer should have known of it, had it but opened its
corporate eyes, [and] it is unreasonable not to have done so."92
Utilizing this negligence standard, courts limit employer liability
85.
86.
87.
88.

Burlington, 524 U.S. at 760.
See id. at 762.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 757. The Court rejected respondeat superior as the basis for imposing

liability for sexual harassment because it is not within the scope of employment, and
instead, characterized the standard as deriving from negligence. Id. at 759; Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998).
89. Faragher,524 U.S. at 799.
90. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (reflecting the same

standard).
91. See Mickels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 329 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Spicer v.
Va. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 705,710 (4th Cir. 1995)).
92. Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 1999).
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for sexual harassment by co-workers to instances in which the
employer provided no means of voicing a complaint, or when it
knew of the harassment and did nothing to address it.93
Recognizing the need to constrain this realm of employer
liability for employee actions, the Court indicated in Burlington
that employers would not be held vicariously liable for
harassment perpetrated by their non-supervisory employees. 94
Instead, courts analyze employer liability for harassing
employees under a negligence standard, holding employers
responsible when they had actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment and failed to take appropriate action. 95 The
question of when an employer will be held liable for retaliatory
conduct of its employees, however, remains to be answered.
Employer Liability for Retaliatory Conduct
The Burlington and Faragher decisions revolved around
hostile environment sexual harassment, 96 but there is a wellfounded belief that the holdings also apply to retaliation claims,
expanding both the scope and impact of potential claims.97
Otherwise actionable conduct cannot lead to employer liability
unless that conduct can be attributed to the employer; therefore,
it is important to determine the standards of employer liability.98
Instances of harassment by supervisors, if linked to protected
activity, can be the basis for a retaliation claim under antidiscrimination statutes. 99
The Sixth Circuit found that
retaliatory harassment by a supervisor, in the wake of
Burlington and Faragher, could be actionable, but that the
employer should have the opportunity to prove an affirmative
93. See Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766.
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. See supranotes 89-93 and accompanying text.
96. Burlington Indus., Inc. v Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
97. Butler & Weber, supra note 24, at B5. "Although the Ellerth [Burlington] and
Faragherdecisions involve sexual harassment, the same rationale logically applies to all
forms of unlawful workplace harassment." Id.
98. "Courts are split on ... the standard for liability of an employer for retaliation
that violates Title VII." Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998). Absent a
method to impute behavior to the employer or find it directly liable, a plaintiff would be
unsuccessful in a retaliation suit even if she provided that she engaged in protected
activity, suffered some form of adverse employment action, and demonstrated causal
connection between the protected activity and employment action. See Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 706-07 (5th Cir. 1997).
99. See Ann Clarke Snell & Lisa R. Eskow, What Motivates the Ultimate
Decisionmaker? An Analysis of Legal Standardsfor Proving Causation and Malice in
Employment RetaliationSuits, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1998).
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defense showing that retaliatory harassment did not rise to the
level of a tangible employment action. 100
The Seventh Circuit appears to view the situation in a
similar light, noting "there is nothing to indicate that the
principle of employer responsibility does not extend equally to
other Title VII claims, such as a claim of unlawful retaliation."10 1
In Knox v. Indiana,02 the court found it necessary to ask
whether "the right link [was] established between the employer
and the co-workers, so that the employer can be held responsible
for their actions, and .

.

. [whether] the conduct complained of

constitute[s] something actionable under the statute, such as
discrimination, harassment, or retaliation." 10 3 Accordingly, the
court held that an employer can be liable for retaliatory conduct
of its employees, whether or not they are supervisors, when the
employer 4"know[s] about and fails to correct the offensive
10
conduct."
Applying the tests promulgated in Burlington and Faragher
to retaliation claims, the Tenth Circuit held that if the
perpetrator and the victim are co-workers, then employers will
be liable only under a negligence theory, meaning that the
employer either orchestrated or knew about the harassment and
acted (or didn't act) in such a manner as to acquiesce and
condone the behavior. 05 Retaliation against a co-worker, absent
a directive from the employer, does not seem to further any
objective of the employer or otherwise fit within the scope of
employment. 0 6 Because an employee is acting outside the scope
of employment when she voluntarily engages in retaliatory
conduct, an employer could only be held responsible for that
retaliation if the plaintiff employee can establish direct
responsibility.

0 7

Under this direct negligence standard, the employer's failure
to correct the situation after learning of the retaliatory behavior
is the action for which the employer is held liable.0 8 In essence,

100. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 791-92 (6th Cir. 1999).
101. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
106. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-757 (1998).
107. See Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1265.
108. Cf Burlington, 524 U.S. at 758 ("[The employer's) own negligence is a cause of
the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew
or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.").
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the employer's negligence is the cause of the retaliation. 10 9
Unless the plaintiff can show that her employer condoned the
behavior of her co-workers or acquiesced in the retaliation, the
employer cannot be held liable for the retaliation. Assuming the
behavior can be attributed to the employer, the plaintiff must
then prove a prima facie case of retaliation.
STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE RETALIATION
CLAIM

Most courts apply a three-pronged test to retaliation cases.
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of unlawful retaliation and "must demonstrate: (1)
that she .

.

. engag[ed] in activity/opposition protected, (2) that

she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) that there
was a causal link between [the] activity and the employment
decision." 110 In some jurisdictions, the courts add a fourth
element, requiring that the employer know that the employee
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII."' Because the
employer will most likely have been served if a lawsuit has been
filed or on notice if a claim is placed with the EEOC, it appears
that this fourth prong would be met fairly easily in most cases.
ProtectedActivity
The first element that a plaintiff must establish in a prima
facie retaliation case is that she participated in an activity under
Title VII or opposed a practice that section 703 makes
unlawful."' In the absence of such activity, the law does not
recognize the behavior by employers as being in retaliation for
an employee's complaint of sexual harassment." 3 In other
words, an employee cannot allege retaliation for sexual
harassment complaints if she is only thinking about filing
109. See id.
110. Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enter.*, Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1997). Some
circuits apply a test that is substantially the same, though worded slightly differently.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the employee must demonstrate that "(1) [shel engaged in
activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against
the employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between that protected activity and the
adverse employment action." Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.
1997).
111. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999).
112. See Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Co., 157 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1998); Cude & Steger,
supra note 26, at 377.78.
113. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (1994).
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charges or has simply mentioned the possibility to confidants
and the employer has not learned of such intention. She must
have undertaken an activity under either the opposition or
participation clauses of section 704.114
The legislature specifically provided for and defined what
types of activity can constitute the first element of a prima facie
case of retaliation." 5 Section 704(a) of Title VII recognizes two
distinct forms of protected expression that can satisfy this
element.116 An employer is prohibited from taking retaliatory
action against an employee when it is "(1) because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VIII; or (2) because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VIII."117
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision exists to encourage
employees to report violations." 8 Most likely in an effort to
advance that rationale, "[clourts generally apply a liberal
standard when determining whether an employee has
participited in a protected activity." 1 9 This suggests a less close
analysis of the opposition and participation prongs. Courts have
extended the participation clause to include a mere anticipation
that an employee will file a complaint, 20 and agree that the
opposition clause requires only a reasonable belief by the
employee that the employment practices she opposes were
2
unlawful.1 '
114. Id. For the text of the opposition and participation clause see infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
116. Id.; Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 377-78.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
The EEOC has provided [three] generic examples of opposition

activity, all of which must be read, pursuant to the statute, as involving
unlawful discrimination: (1) "threatening to file a charge or other formal
complaint alleging discrimination;" (2) "complaining to anyone about
alleged discrimination against oneself or others;" [and] (3) "refusing to
obey an order because of a reasonable belief that it is discriminatory ....
Participation activity essentially tracks the statutory definition, i.e.,
having "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]."
Kabat & Katz, supra note 30, at 605 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
118. Infra text accompanying notes 180-92 (discussing the policy underlying section
704).
119. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 121.
120. Id. at 121-22 (citing Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir.
1993)).
121. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 378-79; e.g., Long v. Eastfield Coll. 88 F.3d 300,
304 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F. 2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir.
1983).
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Clearly, an employee who has filed charges with the EEOC
and reported the workplace sexual harassment to the proper
agency, in compliance with the procedures necessary for section
703, -will meet this prong of the prima facie retaliation case.
Notably, the underlying claim of sexual harassment alleged by
the employee does not have to be successful for a court to find
that a plaintiff has satisfied this element of her case. 122 The
Ninth Circuit has held that "[iut is not [even] necessary... that
the employment practice [that formed the basis for the
complaint] actually be unlawful; opposition clause protection will
be accorded 'whenever the opposition is based on a "reasonable
belief' that the employer has engaged in an unlawful
employment practice."1 23 It is possible that a court will not find
for an employee on a sexual harassment complaint, but will find
in her favor on the issue of the retaliatory conduct of her
employer. Without that potential result, the anti-retaliation
provision would lack the force to advance the goal of encouraging
workers to report violations of section 703.
Because Congress specifically provided for the kinds of
activities that are protected under section 704 of Title VII, courts
can use the text of the statute to assist in their determination of
whether an employee has engaged in, protected activity.124
Perhaps to encourage employees to report violations of Title VII,
courts apply a liberal standard to this first prong of a case of
prima facie retaliation. 125 As discussed in the next section of this
Note, the standard for whether a plaintiff has met the second
prong of the prima facie case is not as clear.
Adverse Employment Action
Perhaps the most contested element of retaliation charges is
the second: whether the employee has suffered an adverse
employment action is an issue of debate. 126 Section 703 claims
for sexual harassment also include an adverse employment
action requirement; therefore, the courts can seek guidance from
decisions under that section. 127 Even in that arena, jurisdictions
122. See Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 1384-85 (quoting Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
125. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
126. See Marisa Williams & Rhonda Rhode, Recent Developments in Retaliation Law
and Resulting Implications for the FederalSector, COLO.LAW, Jan. 1999, at 59, 60.
127. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that
courts can utilize other sections of Title VII to help define terms).
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defining an adverse employment action differ in substantive
ways. There is a significant split in the circuits as to what
constitutes adverse employment action for retaliation claims
under Title VII.128 Without a clear resolution of what constitutes
an adverse employment action, employers and employees will
continue to wonder when the employer is liable for retaliation.
Until the courts provide further definition, it will be difficult to
determine whether an employer's failure to address retaliatory
actions toward employees that are initiated by the complainant's
co-workers is actionable conduct.
The text of Title VII provides little assistance in answering
the question of what behavior is necessary to constitute an
adverse employment action. 1 29 "Title VII. . . contain[s] no
language regarding the type of employer conduct that will
trigger a retaliation claim."130 The anti-retaliation provision in
section 704(a) simply states that employers shall not
"discriminate" against employees for taking action protected by
Title VII.13 1 This contrasts with the language of section 703,2
13
which goes further by qualifying the word "discriminate."

"Courts generally agree that employment decisions involving
hiring, granting leave, discharge, promotion, and compensation
suffice as discrimination. " 133 The adverse and significant impact
of such decisions is clear and difficult to refute. 3 4 The difficulty

128. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. See also Eddy, supra note 10, at
372 (stating that the circuits disagree on the proper meaning of adverse employment
action); Kabat & Katz, supra note 30, at 603-04 (same).
129. In construing a statute, the court's primary objective is to give effect to the
legislature's intent. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 396.

When the resolution of a question of federal law hinges on a statute and
the intention of Congress, the courts look first to the language of the
statute. Specifically, the court's first step is "to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case."
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil, Co., 519 U.S. 337,340 (1997)).
130. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 132.
131. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994)).
132. Id. at 709.
133. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 133. The Supreme Court has recognized
these actions to be tangible employment actions. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) ("A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.").
134. Lidge, supra note 18, at 335 ("In most situations, such as a discharge or a failure
to hire, a plaintiff may easily show the material adversity or ultimate nature of the
employer's action.").
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arises when the retaliatory conduct takes less obvious forms,"'
such as ostracism 136 or reprimands.' 3 7
The Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits can be categorized as
requiring the employer's actions to be adverse that rises to the
level of an ultimate decision.138
On the basis of that
requirement, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff had not
made a prima facie case of retaliation when her employer
directed co-workers to ignore and spy on the plaintiff, reasoning
that the "terms, conditions, or benefits of. .. employment were
[not] adversely affected." 3 9 Conversely, the First, Ninth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits do not require the adverse action to rise to
this extent and instead allow "adverse actions which fall short of
ultimate employment decisions."140 The Third Circuit applies a
different test in finding whether the plaintiff has established a
prima facie retaliation case, 141 but the elements of that
requirement imply that the Third Circuit would be classified as
requiring an ultimate employment decision. 142
To summarize these differences, the circuits apply three
general tests for adverse employment actions. The first test is a
narrow view of retaliation, requiring that it must involve a
"material" or "ultimate" employment decision. 143 On the opposite
end of the spectrum, another set of courts has an expansive view
of retaliation, allowing a variety of actions to meet the threshold
135. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 133.
136. See Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am. Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding no adverse action when employer instructed co-workers to ignore employee).
137. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 705 (holding no retaliation when, among other things,
employee was reprimanded for discussing hostility in the workplace with human
resources when she should have been at her work station).
138. See Munday, 126 F.3d at 244; Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1997); Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707; Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 382-84.
139. Munday, 126 F.3d at 244.
140. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998). In Berry
v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit found that
retaliation existed when an employer brought a malicious prosecution action against a
former employee. Id. at 986-87. On this basis, it is likely that the Tenth Circuit can also
be classified as accepting adverse actions that do not rise to the level of an ultimate
employment decision.
141. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996).
142. In Aman, a ruling handed down prior to Burlington and Faragher, the court
required the plaintiff to show that "she was discharged subsequent to or
contemporaneously with . . . [the protected) activity; and ...that a causal link exists
between the protected activity and the discharge." Id. at 1085. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court likely falls into the category of accepting less than an ultimate employment
decision. Though it would not rule on the issue in Johnson v. DwMario, 14 F. Supp. 2d
107 (D.C. Cir. 1998), it held in a retaliation case brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act that adverse actions are not limited to ultimate employment decisions.
See id. at 111.
143. Mattern at 104 F.3d at 708.
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of an adverse employment action.'4 4 Finally, the remaining
circuits apply a test that falls somewhere in the middle, neither
requiring an ultimate employment decision nor setting a low
threshold.145 These courts require that the retaliatory act be
related to the employment, with more than a trivial impact on
46
the employment relationship. 1
In response to the circuit split, and out of a concern that the
adverse action requirement was being interpreted too narrowly,
the EEOC promulgated new guidelines on how courts should
approach the issue of retaliation claims and arguments
regarding adverse actions. 47 The EEOC announced these new
guidelines on May 26, 1998, rendering earlier guidance
obsolete. 48 Reflecting the more liberal approach, the EEOC
found that the Fifth Circuit's requirement that an adverse action
rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision was "unduly
149
restrictive."
Instead of adhering to the restrictive ultimate employment
decision, the EEOC favors the approaches taken in less
restrictive circuits. 50
The EEOC recommends the broader
circuits have applied to these cases.1 51
other
that
interpretation
It finds that the "statutory protections against retaliation
prohibit 'any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory
motive and that is reasonably likely to deter the charging party
or others from engaging in protected activity."'' 152 Based on its
own interpretation, the EEOC finds that section 704 does not

144. See Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (collecting cases in the First, Ninth and Tenth

Circuits that acknowledge adverse employment actions may include actions that fall
short of ultimate employment decisions); Essary & Friedman, supranote 16, at 134.
145. See e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)
("[Though] actions short of termination may constitute an adverse employment action,
... [there must be a] tangible change in duties or working conditions .... ."; Robinson v.

City of Pittsburgh, 120 F. 3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Retaliatory conduct other than
discharge or refusal to rehire is thus proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the

employee's 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' deprives him
or her of 'employment opportunities,' or 'adversely affects his [or her] status as an
employee.'").
146. Essay & Friedman, supra note 16, at 134; see also Nelson v. Upsala, 51 F.3d 383,

388 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe retaliatory conduct must relate to an employment
relationship.").
147. See Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 374 n.3.
148. Id.
149. Id. The EEOC's Fifth Circuit reference was to the holding in Mattern v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1997). Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 374 n.3.
150. See Penny Nathan Kahan, Retaliation Update, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 263, 276 (Am. Law Inst. ed. 1999), WL SE05 ALI-ABA 263.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 276-77.
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mandate or even favor the stricter approach that some circuits
53
have applied. 1
The guidelines include a listing of what types of actions the
EEOC would consider sufficient to constitute adverse retaliatory
action. 15 4 This list includes actions generally agreed to be
sufficient grounds for finding retaliation, such as denial of
promotions and job benefits, demotion, suspension, termination
and refusal to hire. 155 The guidelines additionally suggest that
actions such as threats, reprimands, negative performance
evaluations, new incidents of harassment and limiting access to
internal grievance procedures satisfy the requirement for an
adverse action. 156 By including these actions in its list, the
EEOC goes beyond the types of actions that all the circuits agree
upon and encompasses many that would be excluded by some
circuits in its effort to encourage a broader interpretation.
It is important to recognize that the EEOC guidelines go
beyond the existing case law in many jurisdictions, sometimes
directly disagreeing with it.157 The EEOC is inconsistent with
the approach the majority of courts take on this issue. 158 "Thus,
this Manual does not consistently state the current law, but is in
part a statement of what the EEOC believes the law should
be.-159

In discussing these guidelines, the Fifth Circuit stated they
"are not only not promulgated pursuant to any delegated
authority to define statutory terms and the like but are also not
subject to the notice and comment procedure like regulations
are. " 16

As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC

regulations are "not entitled to the high degree of deference"
usually applied to federal regulations. 1 1 Though it appears the
153. See id.
154. Butler & Weber, supra note 24, at B5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. For example, in Mattern u. Eastman Kodak, 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), the
Court of Appeals held that reprimands do not satisfy the element of adverse action, a
holding directly contrary to the EEOC guidelines. See Id. at 705; Butler & Weber, supra
note 24, at B5.
158. See Kabat & Katz, supra note 30, at 602; see also supra text accompanying notes
99-146 (discussing the tests applied by each of the circuits).
159. See Kabat & Katz, supra note 30, at 602.
160. Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of Texas Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469 (5th Cir..1998),
rev'd on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999).
161. See Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at n.3. But see Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("[EEOC] Guidelines, 'while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'") (citing Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
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courts will not always give much import to these guidelines, it is
important to note that the guidelines will likely be given
deference in many jurisdictions and could influence an

expansion, in some circuits, of the realm of actions for which
employers may be held liable unless, or until, a clear stance is
adopted by a majority of the courts.
In short, courts apply a wide variation of definitions to
determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an adverse
employment action. Several circuits require that an action rise
to the level of an ultimate employment decision.162 Others apply
a test that is much easier to meet and believe that actions falling
short of ultimate employment decisions may constitute adverse
employment actions. 63 Even if a plaintiff is able to show that
she has suffered an adverse employment action and has
established that she engaged in protected activity, she will not
be successful in her retaliation claim unless she can show a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action, the final element of the prima facie claim.
Causal Connection
The final element of a prima facie retaliation claim requires
the plaintiff to prove that a protected party's participation in a
statutorily protected activity was the employer's motivation for
the adverse employment action. 164 It is quite simple to create an
inference of retaliation and may be done with evidence of
temporal proximity. 65 Presenting evidence that the adverse
action took place shortly after the protected activity and
establishing that "the person who undertook the adverse action
was aware of the plaintiffs protected activity before taking the
action" may create this inference.'6
Though it may be relatively easy for a plaintiff to establish a
causal connection between the adverse action and the protected
activity when she can show that her employer knew about the

U.S. 134, 140 (1944))); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 74 n.28 (1984) ("The EEOC's

interpretation of its own rules is entitled to deference.").
162.
163.
164.
657-58
165.
166.

See supra note 138.
See supra note 144.
See Kahan, supra note 150, at 278 (citing Dowe v. Total Action, 145 F.3d 653,
(4th Cir. 1998)).
See Kachmar v. Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).
Kahan, supra note 150, at 280.
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protected activity, it may be more difficult when she cannot show
that her employer knew of her protected action. "Since, by
definition, an employer cannot take action because of a factor of
which it is unaware, the employer's knowledge that the plaintiff
engaged in a protected activity is absolutely necessary .... 167
Without evidence of such knowledge, temporal proximity
between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct loses
its inferential value and the plaintiff will not be able to establish
a causal connection.'6
Though the requirements for causation are not as
controversial as those for an adverse action, there is some
variation between circuits in terms of the exact requirements. In
some circuits, the plaintiff must establish that her employer
"would not have taken the adverse action 'but for' the protected
expression."16 9 Other courts are less stringent and find that it is
sufficient "if the evidence shows that the protected activity and
the adverse action are not totally unrelated."170 While stating
that "no one factor is dispositive," the Sixth Circuit appears to
favor an inference from temporal proximity, noting that evidence
"that the adverse action was taken shortly after the plaintiffs
exercise of protected rights is relevant to causation. " 171 The
District of Columbia Circuit requires both that the employer
have knowledge of the protected activity and that the adverse
1 72
action be close in'time to the activity.
Though courts generally agree on the three primary
elements necessary to establish a prima facie retaliation
claim, 173 they vary in their application of these elements, most
74
notably of the requirement of an adverse employment action. 1
This lack of uniformity and the expansive definition some courts
utilize for adverse employment actions places an unnecessary
burden on employers. In some jurisdictions, employers run the
risk of being liable for the unexpected, non-work related,
reckless behavior of their employees who choose to retaliate
against co-workers on their volition. As the remaining sections
167. Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. In Johnson v. U.S. Dept of Health and Human Serv., 30
F.3d 45 (6th Cir. 1994), the court found no causal connection existed when the plaintiff
had filed an EEOC complaint, but the supervisor who denied a promotion had no
knowledge of the complaint. Id. at 47.
168. See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.
169. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
170. Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 160 F.3d 697, 701 (11th Cir. 1998).
171. Allen v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 413 (6th Cir. 1999).
172. Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
173. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 126-61 and accompanying text.
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of the Note explain, employer failure to address co-worker
retaliatory behavior is not the kind of conduct for which
employers should be held responsible.
EMPLOYER FAILURE TO ADDRESS RETALIATION BY CO-WORKERS IS
NOT ACTIONABLE

Holding an employer liable for the retaliatory actions of
employees against co-workers who have engaged in activity
protected by Title V11 175 is beyond the intended scope of section
704.176 Initially, it must be assumed for this analysis that the
employee has engaged in an activity protected by Title VII. For
illustration purposes, assume the employee has filed a sexual
harassment suit against her supervisor or testified in a
discrimination hearing. When her co-workers retaliate against
her, one argument for employer liability would be that the
employer in some way encouraged or even required the behavior
of the co-workers. If that were the case, the employees would be
acting at the direction of the employer and the employer would
177
be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees,
Alternately, as the following analysis demonstrates, the
employee could argue that an employer's failure to address the
actions the co-workers engaged in of their own will may
constitute retaliatory conduct, which section 704 is intended to
prevent.
Under this argument, the action that must be
examined is the employer's failure to stop or in some other way
address the behavior of the co-workers. If it were possible for an
employee to show that this failure was an actionable adverse
action and that it was in some way causally connected to her
protected activity, then she may be able to recover.1 78 Because
such a failure does not constitute an adverse employment action,
she should not be able to establish these prerequisites, though
her attempts may be met with success in jurisdictions that apply
broad interpretations to the rules requirements.7 9 However,
175. For a discussion of protected activity, see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying
text.

176. See generally Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title VIis Antiretaliation Provision: Are
Employees ProtectedAfter the Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
797, 810-15 (1996) (discussing congressional intent underlying section 704(a)).
177. Cf Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
178. In circuits recognizing a broad definition of adverse employment action, an
employee may be able to recover if co-worker retaliation is sufficiently severe and the

employer, despite knowledge of the retaliation, failed to remedy the situation. E.g. Knox
v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1354 (7th Cir. 1996).

179. See id.
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even in jurisdictions that consider such claims satisfactory to
meet the adverse employment action requirement, allowing
claims for co-worker retaliation is not necessary to further the
goals of Section 704.
Policy Concerns of Section 704 Are Not Applicable to These
Omissions
The primary purposes of the provisions of Title VII
concerning sexual harassment are compensation for the
employee who engaged in the protected activity and deterrence
to employers. 8 0 Therefore, "[tihe underlying purpose of [the
anti-retaliation provision in Section 704(a)] is to enhance the
statute's effectiveness by encouraging employees to report
violations
of the
statute
without fear
of adverse
repercussions." 18 In the words of the Ninth Circuit, section 704
is intended "to protect the employee who utilizes the tools
provided by Congress to protect his rights." 18 2 By granting this
type of protection, an employee will feel comfortable in reporting
violations of the sexual harassment laws without fear of
consequences, such as losing her job or being involuntarily
transferred. "Indeed, if an employer could lawfully retaliate
against an employee for asserting his rights 'then the rights
created [under Title VII] would be without substance.' Section
183
704 is therefore vital to achieve Title VII's intended goals."
The policies behind section 704(a) are vital to the
administration of justice and the effectiveness of section 703, but
the anti-retaliation provision should not be onerous.
The
Supreme Court has held that Title VII is not a "general civility
code" and does not hold employers liable for "ordinary
tribulations of the workplace," 18 4 implying that not every action
or omission will lead to liability.
Holding employers liable for failing to address retaliation by
co-workers, which they do not encourage or participate in, is not
the type of act or omission that section 704 was intended to
prevent.'" Making employers accountable for every interaction
180. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 786.
181. Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 375.
182. Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
183. Tafuri, supra note 176, at 812 (citing 2 EEOC Compl. Manual (BNA) § 614.1(f), at
614:0006).
184. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265"(10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
185. See Tafuri, supra note 176, at 811-12 (discussing congressional intent underlying
section 704(a)).
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between co-workers provides no protection from employees
feeling that their jobs are in danger, that they will be
186
discharged, demoted, or even black-listed.
,The type of strict liability that would follow from extending
section 704(a) to such a degree would not serve Congress' goal of
enabling employees to engage in statutorily protected activities
without the fear of employer retaliation.8 7
Unless Congress
intended for employers to be strictly responsible for any
unsanctioned acts of its employees, there is no need to extend
the protection of section 704(a) to this extent. 188 Employees will
still receive needed protection from acts by their employers after
they file legitimate sexual harassment claims. 8 9 In situations
where co-workers do retaliate, the employee should still feel safe
in approaching management about the actions and having her
concerns addressed.
Moreover, the rights of employers to manage the workplace
must factor into the balance. Courts should be cautious about
intervening with the personnel and daily operating decisions
that employers make. 9° An employer should not be prevented
from taking a legitimate, adverse employment action against an
employee simply because that employee previously engaged in
some form of protected activity.
As succinctly stated by
practitioners Anne Clarke Snell and Lisa Eskow, "[aintiretaliation provisions must not be distorted into grants of
absolute immunity" for the employee. 19 1 Although an employer
should, and in most jurisdictions would, be held accountable if it
186. See id.
187. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 118. But see Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra note 59, at 760 (arguing that extended vicarious liability in discrimination cases
serves the purposes of compensation and deterrence, essential in the protections granted
by Title VII).
188. The concern of imputing responsibility to employers for all acts of employees is
philosophically related to discussions on the extent of an employer's obligation to "police"
a workplace and the standards that are used in determining employer liability for actions
of supervisors and co-workers. See supra notes 51-109 and accompanying text.
189. The Fifth Circuit has found import in that:
[Aln individual who has engaged in protected activity remains entitled to
bring a claim of constructive discharge if the level of claimed harassment
because of her protected activity would cause a reasonable person in the
employee's shoes to resign. Constructive discharge would certainly fall
within the category of an ultimate employment decision.
Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 399-400 (citing Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc.,
123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th
Cir. 1997); Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994)).
190. See Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 408-10 (discussing reasons courts should not
substitute their decisions for that of personnel managers).
191. Snell & Eskow, supra note 99, at 382.
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expressly condoned or directed a campaign of retaliation, not
every employee act can be imputed to the employer, nor can the
employer's failure to act be found to be an adverse employment
action. 19 2 If the courts attributed all employee action to
employers or found them directly liable in negligence when
employees behave in such manner, the standard would
effectively create a duty for employers to make the workplace
absolutely free of discomfort.
Within reasonable limits and with the necessary and
deserved respect for their employees, employers must be free to
conduct their business as they see fit. Expanding vicarious
liability to the extent that employers are responsible for acts of
employees as childish and unrelated to the employment
environment as placing hair in an employee's food is stretching
the protection of anti-retaliation provisions too far. In addition
to being unduly burdensome on employers, protecting such
omissions will do nothing to further the policies behind section
704.
No CausalNexus Exists Between the Employer's Failureand the
ProtectedActivity
Assuming that a plaintiff can establish that the actions of
her co-workers can be imputed to the employer, or that the
employer should be directly liable for such conduct, she still
must be able to show that the action was connected with the
protected activity. The slight disagreement between the circuits
regarding the degree of this connection again creates varying
outcomes and leaves employees and employers uncertain. 193
Nonetheless, without an employer's direction or knowledge of the
actions of the employees, plaintiff employees have a large barrier
that they should not be able to overcome.
194
The Seventh Circuit, in Adusumilli v. City of Chicago,
held that a plaintiff must establish that the defendant "would
not have taken the adverse action 'but for' the protected
expression" to meet the causal connection requirement of a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 19'
"[A]n
employee's maltreatment at work isnot actionable as retaliation
absent proof that an adverse action was taken against the
192. See id. at 382-83.
193. See supra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
194. 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998).
195. See id. at 363 (quoting McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 483 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Klein v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. 766 F.2d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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employee because he or she engaged in protected activity ....
[Simply,] workplace animosity does not always equate with
96
retaliation."1

Regardless of the fact that co-worker retaliation may begin
within a close time after an employee has alleged sexual
harassment in the workplace, "no causal link may exist if the
employee does not allege that her employer was aware of her
protected activity." 197 Whether the adverse action was in
response to an employee's protected activity must be the focus of
investigations. 198 Clearly, when "the ultimate decisionmaker
responsible for the adverse employment action" did not know the
employee had participated in protected activity, "there can be no
inference of retaliation." 199 Lack of knowledge about the coworker's actions would also defeat any inference of temporal
proximity.
The actions of the co-workers would seem to survive
whatever test a court applies for a causal connection. The coworkers, upon learning that the employee has filed charges and
possibly feeling that they are at the center of the charges, are
responding to that situation. Whether out of fear, anger, or
wanting the employee to drop the charges, her co-workers have
decided to take action. In the scenario of co-workers retaliating
against the employee, the employer's failure to address the
adverse employment action must be the focus of the inquiry into
a causal connection, not the acts of the co-workers.
The employer's action, in this case inaction, could not
conceivably be in response to the protected activity unless the
employer initiated the action of the co-workers or the liability
arises because the employer knew of such action and refused to
respond. 200 Inaction on the part of the employer could be for any
number of reasons. It would be very difficult to show that the
employer's omission would not have been done "but for" the
protected activity, 20 ' as it is far more likely that the employer did

nothing simply because it did not know of the retaliatory
conduct. In a situation in which workers are retaliating against
other employees, absent a supervisor's direction, there can be no
196. Snell & Eskow, supra note 99, at 396 n.58 (citing Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,

110 F.3d 1180, 1185 (5th Cir. 1997).
197. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 143.

198. Snell & Eskow, supra note 99, at 383.
199. Id. at 402.
200. Requiring a causal connection may limit the ability of courts to impose liability on
employers premised on a theory of constructive notice. See supra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text.
201. See Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).
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clear inference that any adverse employment action or change in
the conditions is attributable to the employer or for the purpose
of retaliation.
Employer Failureto Address Such Action Is Not an Actionable
Adverse Decision
Although many jurisdictions have addressed the issue, there
is no consensus of whether an employer's failure to respond to
co-worker harassment because of an employee's protected
activity is an adverse employment action for retaliation claim
purposes.20 2 Much of this debate stems from the inability to
arrive at a consensus on the definition of an adverse employment
action.

20 3

The Fifth Circuit summarized the argument against finding
that an employer's failure to address the retaliatory acts of
employees is an adverse employment action. In Dollis v.
Rubin,20 4 the court reasoned that "Title VII was designed to
address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every
decision made by employers that arguably might have some
tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions."2 0 5 A contrary
finding would "expand the definition of 'adverse employment
action' to include

.

.

.

anything which might jeopardize

20 6
employment in the future. Such expansion is unwarranted."
Determining that an employer's omission in similar cases was an
adverse action would open the door to the sort of strict liability
that the Supreme Court, absent an affirmative defense, declined
207
to allow in Burlington and Faragher.
202. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 445 (2d Cir.
1999). 'Courts disagree about whether an employee suffers 'adverse employment action'
for the purposes of a retaliation claim when, as [the plaintiffl alleges, her employer
allows her co-workers to harass her because she engaged in protected activity." Id.
203. For a discussion of these differences, see supra notes 126-46 and accompanying
text.
204. 77 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995).

205. Id. at 781-82. In some courts, judges cite the variance in the language of section
703 and section 704 to justify a difference between the availability of hostile environment
sexual harassment claims and retaliation claims. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
104 F.3d 702, 710-13 (5th Cir. 1997) (Dennis, J., dissenting)). "Specifically, § 703(a)

protects against alleged adverse action which does not rise to the level of an ultimate
employment decision, while § 704(a)'s protection is limited to only ultimate employment
decisions."

Cude & Steger, supra note 26, at 399.

Section 703(a) extends to any

discrimination "that 'would tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities.'"
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX2) (1994)).

206. Essary & Friedman, supra note 16, at 135 (quoting Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708).
207. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of liability

imposed on employers when supervisors harass employees).
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0 8 and
Consistent with the rules promulgated in Burlington=
0
9
Faragher, the employer's failure to address the retaliation will
likely be actionable when a supervisor is responsible for the
retaliation. In that instance, the action of the supervisor, if
sufficiently high in the organization, may be deemed that of the
employer and it will be the retaliatory action rather than failing
to address such behavior for which the employer will be found
responsible. The Eighth Circuit has held:

[Wihere a supervisory employee has the power to hire, fire,
demote, transfer, suspend, or investigate, and is also shown
to have used that authority to retaliate for the filing of a
complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer
participated in or knew or should have known of the
retaliatory conduct. 210
Even then, the employee would have to establish that the
employer used those supervisory powers to retaliate against her.
When co-workers commit retaliatory conduct, the rationale
for extending liability that exists with supervisors fails; the
courts must then analyze whether the failure of the employer to
take action can be deemed retaliatory conduct. The Fifth Circuit
has held that "[hiostility from fellow employees, having tools
stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute
ultimate employment decisions, and therefore are not the
required adverse employment actions."211 Likewise the Third
Circuit has stated that 'not everything that makes an employee
unhappy' qualifies as retaliation for '[oitherwise, minor and even
trivial employment actions that "an irritable, chip-on-theshoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a
1 2
discrimination suit.""21
Such minor workplace inconveniences
created by co-workers may be inappropriate, but they are not
sufficient to be deemed adverse employment actions.213

208. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1998).
209. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 784-85 (1998).

210. Lipman & Cain, supra note 73, at 588 (citing Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059,
1074 (8th Cir. 1998)).
211. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
212. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Smart
v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 274 (7th Cir. 1996))). An actionable adverse employment action
should not arise out of the predictable tension that arises in the workplace. See Hopkins
v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 836 (D. Md. 1994) (citing Raley v. Bd. of St.
Mary's County Comm'rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272, 1281 (D. Md. 1990).
213. See id.
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Absent action by a supervisor with real power or consent or
direction from an employer, co-worker retaliation does not rise to
an ultimate employment decision that is necessary to satisfy the
second prong of a prima facie retaliation case. The environment
of a workplace prevents courts from finding this type of failure
as being an actionable adverse employment decision. Although
ostracism and other actions of co-workers may create an
unpleasant environment that people should not have to work in,
the employer cannot be held responsible for that environment.
The Tenth Circuit, citing language used by the Supreme
Court in Faragher,implied that an employer's failure to address
this type of retaliatory conduct would not be prohibited by
section 704: "We doubt that the few actions identifiably taken by
co-workers, which generally seem to involve incidents of
rudeness, are sufficient to support a claim for retaliation, given
that Title VII neither is a 'general civility code' nor does it make
actionable the 'ordinary tribulations of the workplace.'" 214 This
sentiment echoed a prior decision of the First Circuit that "the
mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer's act or
omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a
materially adverse employment action." 215 Absent a finding of a
materially adverse employment action, the court could not find
2 16
the employer liable.

In Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co.,217 the court held that there
was no adverse employment action when the plaintiffs only
claim of retaliation was that her co-workers shunned her 215 by
219
keying her car, slamming doors and making rude comments.
Not all courts are in agreement that the plaintiff in Scusa has
not established a claim. The Third Circuit, in a case dealing
with racial harassment, held that an employer's failure to
respond to an atmosphere of harassment following an employee's
protected activity may permit inference that the employer
himself participated in the harassment and thus engaged in the
retaliatory conduct. 2 0
Many courts have extended liability to employers for failing
to address the actions of employees only when the actions of the
214. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
215. Blackie v. Maine., 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir. 1996).
216. See id. at 726.
217. 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999).
218. Id. at 969-70.
219. Id. at 961-62.
220. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 922 (3d Cir. 1997).

20001

BEYOND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY

271

co-workers are severe.2 21 Even when the conduct of the workers
is severe, courts may still limit an employer's liability for
retaliatory conduct by co-workers to situations in which its
supervisory personnel orchestrated or knew about and
stated in
acquiesced in the harassment. 222 As the Second Circuit
23
Richardson v. New York State CorrectionalService: 2
Just as an employer will be liable in negligence for a ...
sexually hostile work environment... if the employer knows
about . .. that harassment but fails to take appropriately
remedial action . . . so too will an employer be held

accountable for allowing retaliatory co-worker harassment to
occur if224it knows about that harassment but fails to act to
stop it.

When the retaliatory conduct of an employee's co-workers is not
brought to a supervisor's or manager's attention, it seems
difficult to argue that the employer has taken any action that
would justify a judgment against the company.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court made clear in its decisions in
Burlington and Faragherthat companies will be held liable for
certain acts of supervisors, the Court has yet to address
employer responsibility for retaliatory acts of its non-supervisory
employees. The Court also has not addressed the disparity in
the manner circuit courts define an adverse employment action
necessary to support a claim of retaliation. Given the increase in
retaliation claims and the overall volume of such claims, it is
important that the Court define the standards of an employer's
responsibility to police the workplace and specifically address
the types of actions that can form the basis for a retaliation
claim.
An employer's failure to address co-worker retaliation is not
the type of behavior for which an employer should be
responsible. Employers must be given some leeway to allow
their employees to govern their own behavior, so long as that
behavior is not discriminatory or dangerous.

221.
222.
223.
224.

See, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id.
180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
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Nonetheless, even if the Court determines that the actions of
employees can be attributed to the employer or that employers
should be directly liable in negligence for failing to respond,
expanding liability to this extent would not advance the policy
goals inherent in the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
Section 704 is intended to prevent employers from retaliating
against an employee who has exercised her rights provided by
section 703. Applying the provision in situations of co-worker
retaliatory harassment would simply create an unwarranted
obligation for employers to strictly police the workforce.
Limiting section 704 to actions of employers or supervisors, and
instances in which the employer has orchestrated the co-worker
retaliation, would still provide adequate protection; the section
would retain ample prohibitions for an employee to feel secure in
raising sexual harassment claims against her employer.
Moreover, this type of inaction is not an ultimate
employment decision and, therefore, is not an adverse
employment action that Title VII prohibits. Although it is
unfortunate for any person to feel ostracized in the workplace,
adverse employment actions should be limited to those that
significantly impact the terms and conditions of employment.
Finally, absent express encouragement or direction, there is no
connection between an employee's protected activity and this
type of failure on an employer's behalf.
Until the Court resolves these issues, employers must take
special care to avoid liability for actions between employees.
Absent clear standards, employers could potentially be liable for
a wide range of retaliatory acts of their employers. To avoid
liability, employers may have to carefully monitor all
interactions and take special precaution to extend sexual
harassment training to include education regarding retaliation.
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